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WHERE’S THE BEEF?  A FEW WORDS ABOUT PAYING  
FOR PERFORMANCE IN BANKRUPTCY 
JONATHAN C. LIPSON†
 
In response to Yair Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy:  Why 
CEOs Should Be Compensated with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (2007).   
 
 
Few business law subjects get jaws flapping like executive compen-
sation.  When we see Michael Ovitz and Robert Nardelli receive mil-
lions of dollars—for doing a bad job—we have to wonder whether our 
system’s incentives might be askew.1  Indeed, some of our best recent 
business law scholarship wrestles with the difficult questions posed by 
executive compensation, which, to paraphrase Bebchuk and Fried, 
reduce to this:  How do we link pay to performance?2
Yair Listokin has invited us to map this discussion onto the ques-
tion of executive compensation in Chapter 11 reorganization.3  It is a 
welcome invitation, because there is doubtless value in thinking care-
fully and creatively about improving incentives for those in control of 
a debtor in possession (DIP) in reorganization under Chapter 11.4  
† Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2007; Professor 
of Law, Temple University—James E. Beasley School of Law.  This Response benefited 
from very thoughtful comments from Robert Rasmussen, as well as conversations with 
The Honorable Elizabeth Snow Stong, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern 
District of New York.  All defects are, of course, my responsibility. © 2007 Jonathan C. 
Lipson, all rights reserved. 
1 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (2006) (upholding 
Ovitz’s severance package valued at approximately $130 million); Nardelli’s ‘Severance’, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2007, at A12 (announcing Nardelli’s $210 million severance pack-
age). 
2 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:  THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 189-90 (2004) (“Well-designed 
executive compensation can provide executives with cost-effective incentives to gener-
ate value for shareholders.  Unfortunately, the promise of such arrangements has not 
yet been fully realized.”). 
3 Yair Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy:  Why CEOs Should Be Compen-
sated with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 783 (2007). 
4  Numerous sections of the Bankruptcy Code were amended by the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 
23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
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Large corporate debtors are, like all large (and small) corporations, 
ultimately run by human beings.  Being fallible, greedy, and complex, 
one easily could imagine that the people who manage Chapter 11 
debtors might engage in the same sort of agency arbitrage that we see 
between the managers of large publicly held corporations and those 
corporations’ widely dispersed shareholders.  Although management 
agency costs are well studied outside of bankruptcy,5 they have gone 
largely unnoticed in bankruptcy scholarship in recent years.6  That 
Listokin wishes to “reorient the scholarly debate in bankruptcy toward 
the problem of executive compensation” is good news.7
In simple terms, Listokin believes that properly constructed incen-
tive compensation packages would promote effective management 
and constrain agency problems in Chapter 11 reorganizations by em-
powering creditors’ committees to pay management with corporate 
debt.  This would align the interests of management with those of the 
“true” residual claimants of the reorganizing debtor—the unsecured 
creditors.  Listokin would thus give to the creditors’ committee the 
right effectively to assign to management a portion (a “vertical strip”) 
of the corporation’s debt as part of management’s compensation.8
There is much about Listokin’s article that is valuable.  He pro-
vides a rigorous economic analysis of some of the unexpected implica-
tions of incentive compensation in reorganization.  He shines consid-
erable light on a rather dim corner of bankruptcy and corporate 
governance.  Perhaps more importantly, he sets the stage for further 
5 The locus of most discussions of agency cost is Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 
J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
6 This is not to say that we lack any data.  Somewhat surprisingly, Listokin fails to 
cite two important empirical studies of executive compensation in bankruptcy.  See 
Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed 
Firms:  An Empirical Analysis, 48 J. FIN. 425, 425 (1993) (analyzing “senior management 
compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately 
restructured their debt to avoid bankruptcy during 1981 to 1987”); Lynn M. LoPucki & 
William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Pub-
licly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 673 (1993) (showing “empirically that nei-
ther the assumption of shareholder control nor the assumption of creditor control is 
correct”).  While executive compensation practices have undoubtedly changed in the 
years since these studies were published, many of the underlying problems have not. 
7 Listokin, supra note 3, at 783. 
8 See id. (proposing this “novel form of managerial incentive compensation for 
publicly traded corporations in bankruptcy”).  
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inquiry.9  But I also have doubts and concerns.  I am persuaded nei-
ther that there is much of a problem, nor by the solution he proposes. 
I.  WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?  WHERE’S THE BEEF? 
Listokin starts from two seemingly incompatible assumptions:  (1) 
management compensation in reorganization is needlessly re-
stricted;10 and yet, (2) the current menu of compensation schemes in 
bankruptcy creates the wrong incentives and may be subject to mana-
gerial manipulation.11  The problem with the first assumption is that it 
lacks empirical support; the problem with the second is that, while it 
may be true outside of bankruptcy, Listokin has not demonstrated 
that it pertains within bankruptcy.12
A.  Needlessly Restricted Compensation 
Listokin assumes that there are needless constraints on manage-
ment compensation in reorganization.  He notes that management 
compensation in bankruptcy, as currently conceived, might take one 
of three general forms:  (1) cash “pay-to-stay” bonuses (sometimes 
known as “key employee retention plans,” or KERPs);13 (2) rapid-
reorganization bonuses,14 and (3) shares of firm value.15
9 As if passing Listokin in the night, M. Todd Henderson, of the University of  
Chicago, recently posted a draft article entitled Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy:  Executive 
Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ. Work-
ing Papers (2d series), Paper No. 306, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract_id=927081.  Rather than looking for lessons about bankruptcy in corporate 
governance literature, however, Henderson uses bankruptcy cases—where, he claims, 
“agency costs are dramatically reduced as sophisticated investors consolidate owner-
ship interests”—to argue that, ergo propter hoc, “reducing agency costs does not cause 
material changes in the fundamental nature of compensation bargains.”  Id. at 3.  So 
far as I can tell, neither Listokin nor Henderson cites the other. 
10 Listokin, supra note 3, at 779 & n.1 (citing DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS 
OF BANKRUPTCY 183 (3d ed. 2001)). 
11 Id. at 782-83. 
12 Nor has he explained how both could be true at the same time:  the former, if 
true, would tend to undercut the latter. 
13 Listokin, supra note 3, at Part II.B.1.  Amended section 503(c)(1) of Chapter 11, 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, § 331, 119 Stat. 23, 102, prohibits the allowance and payment of sums to insiders “for 
the purpose of inducing such person to remain” with the business “absent a finding by 
the court based on evidence in the record” that (1) the payment is “essential” to the 
retention of the individual “because the individual has a bona fide job offer from an-
other business at the same or greater rate of compensation”; and (2) the services of 
that individual are “essential to the survival of the debtor’s business.” 
14 Listokin, supra note 3, at Part II.B.2. 
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This set of choices is problematic, Listokin argues, because some 
or all of these mechanisms may “skew” incentives.16  Managers may re-
ceive cash awards to stay with the firm through bankruptcy, and then 
receive a better offer and leave, keeping (or already having spent) the 
KERP payment.  Managers may propose strategies that overvalue or 
undervalue the firm, that seek liquidation when reorganization would 
be optimal, or vice versa, and so on.  Yet, while these problems may 
exist in theory, they do not appear to exist in practice—at least not in 
the ways Listokin imagines. 
Consider first the legal constraints on incentive compensation.  
Recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code—new section 503(c), to 
be specific—do, in theory, make certain types of compensation plans 
(in particular, KERPs) more difficult for DIPs to adopt.  But, if recent 
cases are any indication, courts appear willing to tolerate creative at-
tempts to circumvent the statute.17
In the Dana case decided last fall, for example, the DIP initially 
proposed an executive retention plan to which a number of parties 
objected.18  Judge Lifland denied the motion as violating section 
503(c) because, among other reasons, it guaranteed management a 
completion bonus and set bonus targets too low.19  The parties—in 
particular, the DIP and the committees—thereafter met and negoti-
ated a resolution.  The DIP then asked the court to reconsider its 
original denial of the motion, on the theory that there was substantial 
agreement by the parties.  Judge Lifland denied that request as moot, 
15 Id. at Part II.B.3-4 (referring to such plans as “percentage-of-assets” and “pro-
portion of equity” compensation plans). 
16 Id. at Part II.B. 
17 See, e.g., In re Dana Corp., No. 06-10354 (BRL), 2006 WL 3479406, at *5 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2006) (“[S]ection 503(c) was not intended to foreclose a Chapter 11 
debtor from reasonably compensating employees, including ‘insiders,’ for their contri-
bution to the debtors’ reorganization.”).  I will refer to this decision as Dana II, even 
though I cite it first, because it is the latter of two important opinions in the case on 
the same issue—namely, whether a KERP was “subject to limitations of section 503(c) 
of the Bankruptcy Code or can . . . be construed to be an incentivizing ‘Produce Value 
for Pay’ plan to be scrutinized through the business judgment lens of section 363?”  In 
re Dana Corp., 351 B.R. 96, 98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Dana I]. 
18 Dana I, 351 B.R. at 98.  Objections “were filed by the Creditors’ Committee, the 
Ad Hoc Noteholders’ Committee, the Equity Committee, the United Aerospace and 
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (the “UAW”) and United Steel, Paper and 
Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial Service Workers Interna-
tional Union (the “USW”) and the United States Trustee.”  Id. 
19 Id. at 102, 103. 
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but he effectively upheld the revised plan because it contained “many 
modifications, changes and alterations.”20
It would be one thing if Listokin were arguing that statutory 
changes that limited KERPs imposed needless costs on reorganization 
by deterring good candidates or requiring more professional (e.g., 
lawyer) time and expense.  But, so far as I can tell, that is not his con-
cern.21  Rather, his concern is largely theoretical, organized around 
the presumed behavior of managers of an insolvent debtor with an 
exceedingly simple capital structure.22  In many respects, his analysis is 
similar in tone and texture to Chancellor Allen’s famous hypothetical 
in the Credit Lyonnais case, in which corporations are assumed to have 
very simple capital structures and implausibly clear options.23  Such 
corporations would be run by agents who would act on these options 
as the predictable “homo economicus” might.24  The problem, of 
course (as discussed further below), is that the real world—where 
20 Dana II, 2006 WL 3479406, at *4.  Judge Lifland continued:  “The plan before 
the Court today, unlike the previous iteration, has no guaranteed payments to the CEO or 
Senior Executives other than base salary and is a substantial retreat from the original 
proposals.”  Id. 
21 Listokin does cite the statute and mention its constraints. See Listokin, supra 
note 3, at 780 n.6 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(c)(1) (West. Supp. 2006) and Jason S. 
Brookner, Law Limits Executive Compensation, TEX. LAW., May 29, 2006, http:// 
www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1150275918997). 
22 See Listokin, supra note 3, at Part II.A–B.1 (discussing incentives created by DIP 
financing and managerial “pay-for-performance” plans). 
23 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 
1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55  (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).  Chancellor Allen’s 
hypothetical analysis of a corporation in financial distress assumes a corporation with a 
single asset—a significant judgment (on appeal) against a solvent corporation—and a 
very simple capital structure.  Chancellor Allen speculated on the level of risk the 
board of the distressed corporation should undertake, concluding, in essence, that di-
rectors of a distressed (but not necessarily insolvent) corporation should be free to 
take more conservative action than might otherwise ordinarily be expected.  Id.  This is 
so because the board is at risk of playing with other peoples’ money.  I offer lengthy 
assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of Credit Lyonnais in Jonathan C. Lipson, 
Directors’ Duties to Creditors:  Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1208-1229 (2003) [hereinafter Lipson, Directors’ Duties], and Jona-
than C. Lipson, The Expressive Function of Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. (forthcoming 2007) (draft of Feb. 16, 2007, manuscript at pp. 12-20, on file with 
author). 
24 “Homo economicus” is shorthand for the sort of rational self-maximizer on 
which traditional price-based economic theory depends.  This rational self-maximizer 
has taken a pummeling in recent years, as many scholars have argued that people do 
not, and should not be expected to, act in these ways.  See generally Lynn A. Stout,  On 
the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don’t Want To Invite Homo 
Economicus To Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 24-25 (2003) (asserting that the 
homo economicus model of corporate behavior should be abandoned to reflect the pos-
sibility of altruistic behavior). 
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Listokin presumably wants his proposal to be digested—is not so sim-
ple. 
Similarly, Listokin assumes that the existing tools available to par-
ties in reorganization are inadequate.  But there is no apparent reason 
why a plan of reorganization could not already achieve what I think is 
his real goal—treating management compensation as pari passu with 
unsecured creditors’ claims.  A reorganization plan could certainly is-
sue to managers some of the same consideration that creditors re-
ceive.25  This is a point Listokin appears to concede.26
If his claim is instead that the failure is one of imagination—not 
one of the legal system as it currently exists—then he must answer 
what is sometimes called the “Chicago” question, namely:  why don’t 
we do this already?  If, as he seems to assume, we are rational self-
maximizers, and the law has not kept debt compensation out of the 
reorganization toolbox, what has?  If the answer is “nothing,” then 
perhaps the market has no appetite for his offering. 
B.  Thieving Managers 
Listokin’s second problematic assumption is that management 
could somehow get away with manipulating firm value under the cur-
rent regime.27  Because managers have “the best information about 
the company’s true value,” Listokin fears that they will misstate firm 
value and “wreak havoc with the courts’ ability to ensure that  
§ 1123(a)(4) is observed.”28  But this embeds a number of question-
able subsidiary assumptions.  First, bankruptcy reorganization neces-
sarily involves a number of players who typically devote a significant 
25 See 11 U.S.C.A § 1123(b)(6) (2006) (stating that reorganization plans may “in-
clude any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions 
of this title”). 
26 See Listokin, supra note 3, at 801 (“Upon confirmation of a reorganization plan, 
the manager would receive the given percentage of whatever amount the original 
creditors receive in lieu of debt.”).  In fairness, Listokin may mean that the grant would 
occur at the outset, while the payout would come only at confirmation.  Unfortunately, 
his proposal (or at least the version we saw) was not specific on timing.  While a pre-
plan grant would be innovative, it would also be problematic, for the reasons discussed 
in Part II, below. 
27 See Listokin, supra note 3, at 795 (“Equity compensation plans . . . give managers 
incentives to understate the value of equity in order to get a plan confirmed that 
maximizes the value of the manager’s stake in the reorganized company’s equity.”). 
28 Id. at 795-96.  Section 1123(a)(4) requires a reorganization plan to “provide  
the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the holder  
of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment.”  11 U.S.C.A  
§ 1123(a)(4) (2006). 
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amount of time to understanding firm value, which (as discussed fur-
ther below) is itself a complex proposition.  DIP lenders, unsecured 
creditors’ committees, and—perhaps more importantly—the profes-
sionals they hire, all usually receive substantial amounts of informa-
tion about the DIP as it attempts to reorganize.  Therefore, it seems 
highly unlikely that managers would be able to manipulate firm value 
undetected. 
Listokin also assumes that managers would want to do this.  Yet he 
ignores the fact that, in many cases, creditors will have played a role in 
hiring managers in the first place.  Often, reorganizing firms use 
“turnaround” professionals, also called “chief reorganization officers” 
(CROs), recommended by creditors.29  CROs usually do not remain 
with the corporation in the event that it reorganizes successfully.  
Their job is to right the ship, and to pass the firm to someone who will 
manage it for the long haul.  They are scrutinized by bankruptcy 
judges, the United States Trustee, and all of the other repeat players 
in these cases (in particular, other professionals).  It is unlikely that 
these turnaround experts could afford to anger them by fudging the 
firm’s books. 
This possibility suggests the more general flaw in Listokin’s as-
sumptions.  Reorganization under Chapter 11 introduces a number of 
unique checks and balances into the management of the firm.  In-
deed, one of the reasons managers often want to keep a distressed 
company out of bankruptcy is to avoid the added levels of scrutiny and 
process imposed in the “fishbowl” of bankruptcy proceedings.  
Listokin could argue that these checks and balances somehow inter-
fere with optimal compensation structures in reorganization, but he 
does not.  Perhaps he does not because, so far as we can tell, they cre-
ate no significant problems. 
This should not suggest that bankruptcy is free from agency con-
flicts, or that Listokin’s reckoning of the costs created by these con-
flicts is unwelcome.  Indeed, if we are to continue to introduce greater 
market incentives into reorganization, we might see more of the 
agency problems we already find in the larger economy.  But today, I 
am not persuaded by his assumptions or characterization of the prob-
lem. 
29 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of 
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1233-34 (2006) (discussing the role of 
CROs and observing that “banks may condition the waiver of loan covenants on the 
appointment of a CRO”). 
71 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 64 
PENNumbra 
 
II.  WHAT’S THE SOLUTION? 
If one nevertheless believes there is a problem, Listokin has a solu-
tion:  give creditors’ committees the power to pay management with 
corporate debt (the “proposal”).30  As he explains: 
[I]f the majority of the members of the committee approve a given per-
centage of debt compensation and the percentage meets a number of 
guidelines detailed later in this Article, then the manager should receive 
the given percentage of all the noncontingent unsecured claims on the 
company.  Upon confirmation of a reorganization plan, the manager 
would receive the given percentage of whatever amount the original 
creditors receive in lieu of debt.  For example, if debt in the original 
company is transformed into equity in the reorganized company, then 
the manager would receive a percentage of equity, and if the unsecured 
debt is transformed into debt in the reorganized company, then the 
manager would receive a percentage of this debt claim.
31
Boiled down, there are three key ingredients in the proposal:  (1) 
the creditors’ committee would have something that it could use to 
encourage (“incent,” in the vernacular) management; (2) this incen-
tive would come in the form of a currency that rendered some portion 
of executive compensation pari passu with unsecured creditors; and 
(3) it would be the creditors’ own money, in a sense, that they were 
spending.  I consider each of these elements in turn. 
A.  The Creditors’ Committee 
Consider first the notion that we would vest creditors’ committees 
with some real, positive incentive to work with.  For the most part, 
creditors of a Chapter 11 debtor have very limited tools to motivate 
and discipline management.  Individual creditors can do virtually 
nothing, especially if they are unsecured.  Creditors’ committees may 
investigate and consult, but—at least as a statutory matter—their pow-
ers are stated entirely in the conditional and therefore are limited.  
Specifically, a creditors’ committee 
may—(1) consult with the . . . debtor in possession concerning the ad-
ministration of the case; (2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabili-
ties, and financial condition of the debtor . . . ; (3) participate in the 
formulation of a plan . . . ; (4) request the appointment of a trustee or 
30 See Listokin, supra note 3, at 800 (“To improve managerial performance, I pro-
pose that the committee be granted the right to award managers a percentage of the 
unsecured debt of the insolvent firm.”). 
31 Id. at 801 (footnotes omitted). 
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examiner . . . ; and (5) perform such other services as are in the interest 
of those represented.
32
None of these is a positive incentive for management, and, with 
the exception of (4), none is likely to give management much cause to 
worry.  Even (4), which permits the appointment of a trustee or exam-
iner (also known as the “nuclear option”), may be so harsh that no 
creditors’ committee really wants to use this power.  Nowhere is a 
committee, as such, given the power to “incent” management posi-
tively with the promise of, for example, money or other things of 
value. 
Listokin’s proposal would change this by giving unsecured credi-
tors’ committees the power of the purse.  This is perhaps the most in-
triguing feature of the proposal, because it would be a further (per-
haps inexorable) step toward the contractualization of bankruptcy.  If 
we believe that reorganization should exhibit greater market tenden-
cies, this might be a step in the right direction.33  The proposal would 
give creditors’ committees greater leverage in negotiations with par-
ticipants in the debtor’s reorganization, including DIP lenders, se-
cured creditors, and existing equity holders, all of whom have various 
tactical strengths but none of whom can directly compensate man-
agement. 
One of the more interesting questions raised by the proposal is 
the effect it would have on relations with professionals.  It is reasona-
bly well accepted that professionals—primarily lawyers and account-
ants—play an important role in reorganization.  Their services are not 
free, and the cost of their services has been cited as one of the reasons 
reorganization was historically viewed as an inefficient mechanism for 
resolving corporate financial distress.  If creditors’ committees were 
given the proposed form of currency to spend, perhaps they would be 
less dependent on their professionals.  If committees were less de-
32 11 U.S.C.A. § 1103(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
33 A running debate about bankruptcy, as in most discussions about private order-
ing, concerns the role of contract.  Several prominent scholars—notably Barry Adler 
and Alan Schwartz—have offered thought-provoking proposals for the use of contracts 
that would, at least in theory, produce more efficient results than those that are ob-
tained under the existing legal regimes that govern or influence bankruptcy reorgani-
zation.  See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 
352 (1997) (developing a proposal for the use of pre-bankruptcy contracts that would 
use “Chameleon Equity,” stock that would automatically be crammed down by credi-
tors’ claims in the event of insolvency); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 209, 210-11 (1989) (developing a proposal to permit creditors to obtain 
priority purely by contract). 
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pendent on professionals, perhaps the professionals would feel less 
temptation to run up the tab.34
Listokin does not explain in great depth the novelty or implica-
tions of this piece of his proposal, but it is fascinating, as it suggests a 
new basis for thinking about how to generate incentives in reorganiza-
tion. 
B.  Pari Passu Treatment 
The heart of the proposal is that some portion of executive com-
pensation should be more or less pari passu with the “true” residual 
claimants, who are probably the unsecured creditors.  By giving man-
agement a “vertical strip” of unsecured creditors’ claims, manage-
ment’s incentives would be properly aligned. 
The problem is that bankruptcy is a game of uncertain fractions.  
The numerator will be the debtor’s assets, and the denominator will 
be claims against the debtor.  Because the denominator is likely larger 
than the numerator, creditors can expect to receive only a fraction of 
their claims.  But in reorganization, both numbers are exceedingly 
difficult to pin down.  In the case of assets, corporations can have ex-
tremely complex interests that are highly speculative, or simply too 
costly to value.  Who really knew what Enron’s assets were worth at the 
commencement of its reorganization, when management was to be 
retained?  Would it have been worthwhile to figure this out? 
We can identify similar problems with the denominator.  The DIP 
is supposed to file schedules of assets and liabilities when it com-
mences a case.35  The stated amount of a claim will be binding on the 
creditor unless the creditor files a proof of claim in some different 
amount before the bar date, at which point the debtor and creditor 
may either litigate or settle the claim.36  In order to have a reasonable 
handle on the true value of the debtor’s debts—and, therefore, to de-
cide whether to accept or reject Listokin’s proposal—a prospective 
manager would need some understanding of the amount of that debt.  
34 I hasten to add that I am not at all sure professional compensation is necessarily 
a problem.  Professionals are subject to many of the same checks and balances that 
govern DIP management. 
35 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(1) (2006). 
36 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 502(a), 1111(a) (2006).  Bankruptcy Rule 3003(b)(1) provides 
that “the schedule of liabilities filed pursuant to § 521(1) of the [Bankruptcy] Code 
shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claims of credi-
tors, unless they are scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated.”  FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 3003(b)(1). 
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Should she look to the schedules?  Should bar dates now come as first-
day orders?  Listokin does not say. 
This problem is not merely practical; it also suggests that the pro-
posal flunks the economic theory on which it rests.  This is because 
there is probably an inverse relationship between the cases where the 
proposal is possible and the cases where it would be worthwhile.  If the 
capital structure is really as simple as Listokin’s model assumes, how 
good (i.e., expensive) will management need to be?  Simple structures 
suggest simple cases—and therefore simple (i.e., inexpensive) man-
agement. 
If, however, we are running a railroad (or airline) in bankruptcy, 
who is going to spend the time and money to do a meaningful valua-
tion of such a complex corporation at the outset, which is when it 
would have to occur?  If the answer is, as I suspect, no one, then man-
agement would be taking compensation with fairly speculative value.  
Is that the sort of management we would want in a complex reorgani-
zation?  I don’t think so. 
C.  Other People’s Money 
The third element of the proposal is perhaps the most troubling, 
in that the creditors’ committee would be using other creditors’ 
“money.”  While using this incentive would avoid a variety of collective 
action issues, it also would create at least four problems. 
First, it is not, in fact, the creditors’ committee’s money to use.  
Listokin claims that giving a committee the power to bind other credi-
tors “is not a radical idea.”37  He analogizes creditors to shareholders 
who “cannot opt out of stock option plans.  Instead, the shareholders 
are bound by the decision of the board of directors.”38
Here, he runs into trouble, confusing dilution with defeasance.  
Corporate boards may have the authority to issue stock or options to 
management, diluting shareholders’ rights.  But that is not what the 
proposal does.  It does not dilute the value of unsecured claims; it 
takes a share of those claims away, even from creditors who do not 
agree with the implementation of the proposal.  I am aware of no 
state-law authority that would permit, in the executive compensation 
37 Listokin, supra note 3, at 816. 
38 Id. 
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context, a board of directors to do this without shareholder ap-
proval.39
Second, and perhaps more importantly, shareholders have a vari-
ety of checks on directors not available to creditors represented by an 
unsecured creditors’ committee.  Shareholders usually have the right 
to elect directors; creditors’ committees, by contrast, are appointed by 
the United States Trustee.  Moreover, while creditors’ committees may 
be viewed as fiduciaries in certain respects, as a practical matter, direc-
tors are probably subject to better-defined fiduciary standards vis-à-vis 
shareholders (even if outside bankruptcy they may be subject to man-
agement capture). 
Third, Listokin writes as if all unsecured creditors were more or 
less normatively the same.  But, of course, many creditors have not 
chosen to extend credit—terminated employees and tort creditors 
come to mind.  It seems one thing to give away a percentage of a con-
tract creditor’s debt, and another to do that to an involuntary credi-
tor.40  Unfortunately, Listokin’s proposal does not differentiate among 
creditors, except as to priority. 
This brings us to the final problem:  the proposal fails to account 
for the way priority really works among unsecured creditors.  Listokin 
suggests that senior unsecured creditors should have the right to opt 
out of the proposal.41  This may make theoretical sense (junior credi-
tors should not give away senior creditors’ money).  It ignores, how-
ever, the fact that identifying the senior unsecured creditor will often 
be even more difficult than identifying the hypothetical residual 
claimant (i.e., the most junior creditor). 
When unsecured creditors are parties to “senior” credit arrange-
ments, they will not necessarily obtain contractual priority over all 
general unsecured creditors; they will have priority over only those 
parties who have expressly agreed to subordinate their claims to those 
39 Even Delaware, surely more director-friendly than many jurisdictions, would 
forbid this.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 242(b)(2) (2001) (giving a class vote to share-
holders where a proposed charter amendment would “alter or change the powers, 
preferences, or special rights of 1 or more series of any class so as to affect them ad-
versely”). 
40 See Lipson, Directors’ Duties, supra note 23, at 1242-51 (discussing variations in 
“volition, cognition, and exit” among corporate creditors). 
41 Listokin, supra note 3, at 812 (“Senior unsecured creditors should be allowed to 
‘opt out’ (as a group) of the debt compensation package.”). 
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senior creditors.42  Thus, it will usually be much easier to identify jun-
ior unsecured creditors than senior unsecured creditors.  Junior credi-
tors are creditors who contractually subordinate their claims to those 
of the senior creditors.  For this reason, we sometimes call their debt 
“junk” (or, if you work in the marketing department, “high yield”). 
Listokin makes this concession to senior creditors based, in part, 
on the supposition that senior unsecured creditors are “likely” to have 
their own committees.43  I am aware of no empirical studies on this 
(and Listokin cites none), but it seems unlikely that in all but the most 
unusual cases there would be separate committees of senior unsecured 
creditors—in part because they are so hard to identify. 
CONCLUSION 
My skepticism about Listokin’s proposal does not dilute my re-
spect and admiration for his effort.  His contribution is part of an im-
portant line of creative attempts by theoreticians to grapple with the 
exceedingly complex dynamics of financial distress in general, and re-
organization in particular.44  He has produced an interesting and 
thought-provoking proposal that attempts to address a matter that 
certainly promises to be more, rather than less, challenging as we go 
forward.  While he may not have found the right beef about executive 
compensation in reorganization, he has assuredly given us food for 
thought. 
 
42 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 510(a) (2006) (“A subordination agreement is enforceable in a 
case under [Chapter 11] to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under 
applicable nonbankruptcy law.”). 
43 Listokin, supra note 3, at 813. 
44 For examples of others’ proposals, see sources cited supra note 33. 
